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Abstract. This article describes the political denial that is implemented by terrorists and supporters of 
terrorists after an adversary counterterrorist operation and that is intended to impede future 
operations. Sudanese-sponsored and supported terrorism and United States Government 
counterterrorist operations are used as an example. The analysis is predicated on the assumption that 
there is incontrovertible intelligence data supporting the belief that Shifa Pharamceutical Industries in 
Sudan was engaged in the development and/or transshipment of the chemical warfare agent VX--an 
assumption based on the alleged detection of a VX precursor that allegedly has no legitimate business or 
industrial use. (IBPP Note: As of this writing, there are at least three alternative hypotheses: (1) The 
precursor was accurately detected but can have other innocuous uses. (2) The precursor was 
inaccurately detected for an agricultural insecticide with similar chemical structure. (3) The precursor 
was accurately detected but was a byproduct of the breakdown of other pesticides.)  
 
After the United States Government (USG)-sponsored bombing of Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries, a 
number of deception operations have been implemented by terrorists and supporters of terrorists. 
These operations are intended to discover as much as possible about the intelligence and 
counterintelligence sources and methods of the USG and its allies in antiterrorism and counterterrorism 
pursuits. As these sources and methods are compromised, effective antiterrorism and counterterrorism 
operations become ever more difficult. Political denial of terrorist activity--the simplest of the deception 
operations--in response to a counterterrorist operation will be analyzed as an example.  
 
Analysis. The Sudanese Government has denied that the Shifa plant had anything to do with VX 
development and transshipment. This denial can be supported in at least four ways. First, historical data 
support the notion that the USG has intentionally represented falsehoods in at least some foreign policy 
conflicts. Second, segments of global populations are primed to believe that anything represented by 
the USG may be a lie. Third, segments of global populations will not believe that the USG may have 
represented falsehoods in this case but will nevertheless treat Sudanese denials as if the denials were 
true for altruistic and egoistic purposes. Fourth, segments of global populations may exhibit varieties of 
cognitive processing supporting causal and moral attributions that are compatible with the Sudanese 
denial.  
 
As a consequence, the political denial generates external and internal pressures that build on USG 
representatives and their supporters "in the know" to divulge more information leading to the 
conclusion that Shifa and VX were linked. This information can then be analyzed by terrorists and their 
supporters to identify intelligence and counterintelligence sources and methods.  
 
Once identified, the sources and methods can be compromised in several ways. Deceptive practices can 
be implemented so that intelligence sources and methods will pick up and interpret what terrorists and 
their supporters desire to be picked up and interpreted. Nondeceptive practices can be implemented by 
terrorists and their supporters that will not be picked up and interpreted by the USG. In a similar 
manner, deceptive and nondeceptive practices can be implemented against USG counterintelligence.  
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As more and more information is released due to pressure initiated by terrorist and terrorist supporters, 
the compromise of USG intelligence and counterintelligence continues to be facilitated. In fact, the 
pressure itself--once initiated--is then further potentiated by unwitting political entities invested with 
wrong-headed notions of fairness, the golden mean, the good that is within everyone, giving peace a 
chance, abhorrence of tit-for-tat violence, and various psychodynamic conflicts. Also, even sophisticated 
experts--e.g., a former Central Intelligence Agency operations officer with extensive experience 
involving Islamic paramilitary groups (Bearden, 1998)--may contribute to pressure on the 
counterterrorist initiator purely through impartial contemplation, dialogue, and analysis.  
 
Much as a national politician in a democratic republic who is accused of wrong doing must engage in a 
calculus of response based partially on legal, ethical, moral, political, so must the representatives of a 
political entity--especially one purported to be a democratic republic--after having engaged in a 
counterterrorist operation that publicly exhibits that entity's signature. Given that there will almost 
always be significant domestic and international opposition to any political act--including a 
counterterrorist operation--and that operational errors, bad luck, and unique features can easily be 
highlighted or misinterpreted as appropriate, pressure initiated from the political denial of terrorism by 
a counterterrorist target is a cheap, simple, and at least partially effective defense. Interestingly, in an 
analogous fashion, psychodynamic denial is the simplest and most primitive defense mechanism of 
unconscious conflict resolution. And to conclude with a research question, is political denial fueled by 
psychodynamic denial a defensively more or less robust approach to conflict resolution? (See Bearden, 
M. (August 26, 1998). Explaining our actions in the Sudan. The New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com; Martinez, D.C. (1987). On the morality of Machiavellian deceivers. 
Psychology: A Quarterly Journal of Human Behavior, 24, 47-56; Myers, S.L. (August 25, 1998). U.S. says 
Iraq aided production of chemical weapons in Sudan. The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com; 
Myers, S.L., & Weiner, T. (August 27, 1998). Possible benign use is seen for chemical at factory in Sudan. 
The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com; Pachter, H. (1974). When the government is lying. 
Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, 13, 184-195; Webb, R.E. (1998). Journal of 
Constructivist Psychology, 11, 117-132; Welles, J. (1981). The sociobiology of self-deception. Human 
Ethology Newsletter, 3, 14-19.) (Keywords: Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, Intelligence, Sudan, 
Terrorism.) 
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